

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10452
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/1/1962
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REF ID: A234567
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COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO.: TDCS DB-3/650,938

SUBJECT: WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962

DATE DISTR.: 1 AUGUST 1962

DATE OF: 1 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
 REFERENCES: IN

INFO: JDCS-3 (DIA) RECEIVED INFO ON 52 OCT 1965 THAT AG IN THE RVNGVN VIEW

PLACE & DATE ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL: SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.: BELK

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS FENT

SOURCE:

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE OF THE GTV DIEN KHOA CIVIC GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS

CURRENT REPORT MIGHTLY RESEMBLED RECENT (MAY) ADVISED LVL V CHIEF OF THE REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING

DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE PLANNED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONCLUSION. A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN BE INFORMED. CHIEF CONCLUDED THAT NO ONE KNEW THAT TWO BILLION DONG PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.

1. CHIEF CONFIRMED MUNIC. BOA THU EXECUTIVE LVL THE LTGEN MICHEL VIEO ON 1 AUGUST 1962. LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE DIVISIONAL LVL YOUTH & MASSMEDIA AND PROPAGANDA AND NO EXPLANATION ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED VIEO, SPITE OF HIS SWINGING INVITATION CHIEF KNEW HE WOULD BE IMAGINED AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH ANH WOULD. CHIEF VIEO STATED HE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED THAT DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT 21-22 AUGUST 1962. HE KNEW DATE OF LIED CONFIRMED BY TWO CHIEF DOING OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT. CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

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STATE:	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	DIA	OCI	ONE	DOEX	DOBX	DOB	DIA CIB
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A.T.S.

WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. — CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF

SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG

VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU

XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU

INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO

BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE

W. KELVIN BOB V. BOLERO COOK. WENTWELL LSC DREW REC'D. THE BILLED VALUE WHICH IS INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

UNKNOWN BYD WAS LOCATED ON THE NIGHT OF 7-8 MARCH 1968. THIS RELEASE IS FROM CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-

" FORWARDER'S COMMENT: WHILE NOT THE GOOD DR. BUI LIEU REPORTED IN THIS COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED

ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO B-1

RECEIVED
TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE

PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR OH 201)

LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENTARY

TDACS-3 518-127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE

RELEASER
T H O M E S T A C K
ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT

RECEIVED **SEARCHED** **INDEXED** **SERIALIZED** **FILED**

DETAL 005 D-5151 OR NIGHT OF 1-5 VICTIM IDES
WANTED TO EXPERTLY DREW ON A REGISTER
MAJOR LONG ADDER HEAD GENERAL YUAN HAD
DATE 01215 T VICTIM TOS
INFORMED THE VICTIM AND

RECORDED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ON JULY 18, 1968 THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A
TRANSMISSION COMPILED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY BRIGADE ONE ON THE

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INFO

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END OF MESSAGE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.) ID IN BN-VV 3101 TO PEPLOMATE EE F17. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU KIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN. COOL VILLELL EXCELL ECK THE VILLEL OF GONE OR LNE GAN ETEGAWA PAYED IN 85. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE VILLEL EETED COOMAL.

VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.) J-5 VIGORL EGMEAEH VI VILBLOCKWIDTA JEE SWE LING, THE MOUNT DATE 91CE THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPS) INTERCEPTED 2000 WAYS MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

ICAG 102 FIELD COMMENT

WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME SINCE AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED.

GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

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GENERAL NHI FOUNDED IN VIETNAM AND HE IS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP.

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

11. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

FIELD COMMENT.

12. AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 1105. WHILE HEEL HIS AC SOUTHEAST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, VIECHI LIE COULD (JULY 13). FIELD COMMENT. ON THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

C. JULY 14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE OF CINCPAC, ARPA, PACAF, PAETL WERE CONFIDENTIAL.

VIEW: (REDACTED) WHILE FONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OF THE VOICEPIECE
END OF MESSAGE

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